Land & Water Law Review
Volume 11

Issue 1

Article 9

1976

Criminal Procedure - The Entrapment Defense - The Determination
of Predisposition - Janski v. State
W. Michael Kleppinger

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water

Recommended Citation
Kleppinger, W. Michael (1976) "Criminal Procedure - The Entrapment Defense - The Determination of
Predisposition - Janski v. State," Land & Water Law Review: Vol. 11 : Iss. 1 , pp. 265 - 276.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol11/iss1/9

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Land & Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship.

Kleppinger: Criminal Procedure - The Entrapment Defense - The Determination o

CASE NOTES
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE-The Determination of
Predisposition. Janski v. State, 538 P.2d 271 (Wyo. 1975).

The response to criminal activities that are not readily
susceptible to traditional investigative approaches has been
the increasingly widespread use of undercover agents and
informers.' Undercover investigation is often vital to the
efficient and successful prosecution of criminal offenders.'
A countervailing need to protect the citizenry from the excesses of undercover agents and informers has often required
the courts to consider the permissible limits of undercover
investigation. Courts have responded by recognizing the
necessity of undercover investigation in limited criminal
activities but severely condemning investigative excesses.
Insulation of the citizen from abuses of undercover investigation has most frequently found basis in the affirmative
defense of entrapment.
FACTS OF THE CASE

On January 6, 1973, Robert Laabs, an undercover agent
employed by the Casper police, arrived at the residence of
Gary Janski, a young man Laabs had known for one week.
Laabs asked Janski if he could buy some hashish. Janski
replied that it would be necessary to go out to a golf course
and procure the drug from a friend. Janski left the house,
presumably for the golf course, and returned in thirty minutes with two quarter ounces of hashish. Laabs bought the
drug, left Janski's residence and delivered the purchase to
his police supervisor for evidence.
Janski was charged with delivery of a controlled substance in violation of Sections 35-347.14(d) (10) and 35Copyright c 1976 by the University of Wyoming

1. Undercover investigation has been directed largely toward the enforcement
of laws which regulate or proscribe activities such as prostitution and the
use of narcotics and alcoholic beverages, which are considered offensive to
the general welfare. These proscriptions are included in the contemporary
classification, sumptuary offenses. Note, Criminal Law-Entrapment in
the Federal Courts-Subjective Test Reaffirmed Against Lower Court
Departures, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 454 (1973).
2. Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police Rulemaking, 53 TEXAS L. REV.
203, 210 (1975).
3. La Fleur v. State, 533 P.2d 309, 312-13 (Wyo. 1975); Sorrells v. United
States, 287 U.S. 435, 448 (1932); Saunders v. People, 38 Mich. 218, 221

(1878).
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347.31 (a) (ii) of the Wyoming Statutes." An additional
charge of delivery of a controlled substance was pending
against Janski at the time of the trial for the charge in
issue. During the State's case one witness mistakenly referred to the pending offense when he testified that the
Janski-Laabs transaction took place on January 7, when in
fact the sale in question took place on January 6. At the
close of the State's case defendant asked for a mistrial. The
trial court denied the request.
At trial a defense witness, Kevin Doing, testified as a
witness to the Janski-Laabs meeting. Doing related that
Laabs had pushed a gun into Janski's stomach, and told
Janski to procure the hashish and "not to mess around with
Haystack [Laabs]."' On cross-examination Doing was shown
a derringer and replied that the gun used by Laabs was not
the one produced at trial. Laabs, recalled on State's rebuttal,
denied the alleged coercion and identified the gun shown to
Doing as the weapon carried by him on duty. Laabs further
testified that a week after his meeting with Janski he did
carry a .38 revolver, similar to the gun described by Doing.
Laabs' police supervisor then testified that Laabs had carried
the revolver on only one occasion, one week after the Janski
sale. At the close of State's rebuttal defendant requested an
opportunity for surrebuttal, offering to prove by two witnesses that Laabs had threatened one of them with a gun
similar to the weapon described by Doing. The witnesses
were prepared to testify that they had seen Laabs with the
Relevant sections of the statutes are as follows:
WYo. STAT. § 35-347.14(d) (10) (Supp. 1975):
Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule,
any material compound, mixture or preparation which contains
any quantity of the following hallucinogenic substances, their
salts, isomers and salts of isomers, unless specifically exempted,
whenever the existence of these salts, isomers, and salts of isomers
is possible within the specific chemical designation: . . . (10) Marihuana . ...
WYO. STAT. § 35-347.31(a) (ii) (Supp. 1975)
Except as authorized by this act ... it is unlawful for any person
to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or
deliver, a controlled substance. Any person who violates this subsection with respect to: . . . (ii) Any other controlled substance
classified in Schedule I, II, or III, is guilty of a crime and upon
conviction may be imprisoned for not more than ten (10) years,
fined not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both . . ..
5. Janski v. State, 538 P.2d 271, 273 (Wyo. 1975).
4.
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revolver on a number of occasions. The trial court denied
the request for surrebuttal.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty. On appeal to the
Wyoming Supreme Court the conviction was reversed, the
court finding no evidence of predisposition to commit the
offense that would rebut the defense of entrapment. The
State applied for a rehearing which was granted.
HOLDING

Upon rehearing, the court set aside the original opinion
and affirmed the conviction, holding that a showing of ready
compliance on the part of the accused unrelated to a showing
of an existing course of criminal conduct or a pre-formed
design to commit the offense is sufficient to create a jury
issue on entrapment.
THE

Janski

COURT'S REASONING

On original hearing the Wyoming Supreme Court held
that the evidence in the record indicating only that Laabs
went to Janski's residence and solicited the sale of hashish
was not a sufficient showing of predisposition.' The majority
rejected the contention that evidence of Janski's ready compliance was sufficient to prove predisposition and held that
entrapment existed as a matter of law.
Upon rehearing, defendant assigned as error four issues that apply to the entrapment defense: (1) evidence in
the record was not sufficient to overcome the defense of entrapment, rendering the verdict contrary to the evidence;
(2) submission of the entrapment issue to the jury; (3) denial of defendant's motion for a mistrial after evidence concerning the alleged sale of narcotics on January 7; and (4)
denial of defendant's requested surrebuttal.' The court rejected the assignments of error, essentially holding that the
entrapment issue was properly given to the jury.
6. Janski v. State, 529 P.2d 201, 202 (Wyo. 1974).
7. The dissent in Janski forcefully argues that the assignments as error are,
to a degree, interrelated as to the issue of entrapment and the showing of
predisposition. Janski v. State, supra note 5, at 287, 291 (Rose, J., dissenting).
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The majority accepted without reservation the proposition that entrapment can be rebutted by a showing of predisposition through a previous course of similar crimes, a
preformed criminal design evidenced by performance of the
first overt act before solicitation, provision of a mere opportunity to break the law where police have reasonable cause
to believe the accused is engaged in a course of similar activity, or by ready compliance.8 Reversing the position taken
by the court upon original hearing, the majority accepted a
showing of predisposition through ready compliance.'
By adopting the rule that ready compliance is per se
sufficient to establish predisposition and send the issue of
entrapment to the jury, the court laid the groundwork to
affirm Janski's conviction. Relying on a number of "solicitation" cases,1" the court reasoned that predisposition was
sufficiently established through ready compliance to rebut
the allegation of inducement. When the jury, properly receiving the issue of entrapment by virtue of the predisposition
testimony, rejected Doing's testimony as to the threat by
Laabs, the factual issue of entrapment was decided against
Janski. The court reasoned that since entrapment as a matter of law was precluded by the ready compliance to Laabs'
solicitation, the factual finding of entrapment could not be
disturbed.
The court treated the assignments of error in the mistaken date testimony and denial of surrebuttal as immaterial
These criteria are developed by the court in its analysis of the evolution of
the entrapment doctrine. Janski v. State, supra note 5, at 275. See also
text accompanying note 26 infra.
9. In a vigorous dissent, it is argued that only an established pattern of criminal conduct or a demonstrable willingness to commit the offense will serve
as the ultimate provable fact as to predisposition. In this approach, ready
compliance is important as evidence going to the issue of predisposition,
but it is not the ultimate provable fact. Janski v. State, supra note 5, at
286 (Rose, J., dissenting).
10. The "solicitation cases" generally hold that the mere provision of an opportunity for the accused to implement a preexisting design to break the law
is insufficient inducement to sustain the entrapment defense. Sandoval v.
United States, 285 F.2d 605, 607 (10th Cir. 1960) ; Wood v. United States,
317 F.2d 736, 738 (10th Cir. 1963); United States v. Freeman, 412 F.2d
1181, 1183 (10th Cir. 1969). In these cases the inquiry is usually directed
toward the accused's behavior prior to solicitation (preformed design or a
pattern of similar criminal activities). Ready compliance under the Janski
rule, however, looks exclusively to post-solicitation behavior.
8.
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to the defense of entrapment.1" The confusion as to the date
of the Janski-Laabs transaction was not prejudicial since
there was no indication that the jury heard any of the evidence. 2 The denial of surrebuttal was properly vested in
the discretion of the trial judge." Treating the entrapment
arguments, the denial of surrebuttal and the date confusion
as unrelated issues, the Wyoming court found no reversible
error and affirmed the conviction.
THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE

The affirmative defense of entrapment has been characterized as a doctrine developed in the Twentieth Century
which has found nearly universal acceptance in the United
States.' There has, however, been a split of authority as to
the theoretical basis for the defense.1"
A minority of the states and a number of federal jurisdictions in the early 1970's adopted the position set forth in
the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts in Sorrells v.
United States 6 and Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Sherman v.
United States. 7 This is known as the objective theory of entrapment, focusing on the activity of the police and its relation to probable effects upon the reasonable man. The approach is grounded on the theory that certain activities on
the part of the police are so outrageous that, as a matter of
law, they should be judicially prohibited. 8 Courts adopting
this position have held that the state should be estopped from
prosecutions made possible by these techniques.
11. This evidence, however, could potentially be important in the traditional
considerations of predisposition. See the discussion of evidential materiality
under Janski in the text acompanying notes 40 to 42 infra.
12. The dissent, however, indicates that the erroneous testimony was heard
by the jury. Prejudicial implications could not, then, be ruled out. Janski
v. State, supra note 5, at 288 (Rose, J., dissenting).
13. WYo. STAT. § 7-228 (Supp. 1973); State v. Alexander, 78 Wyo. 324, 347,
324 P.2d 831, 839 (1958), cert. denied 363 U.S. 850 (1960).
14. State v. Campbell, 110 N.H. 138, 265 A.2d 11, 13 (1970). Apparently all
states except Tennessee have adopted the defense.
15. For an excellent overview of the entrapment defense as treated by the
Supreme Court, See Note, Criminal Law-Entrapment in the Federal
Courts-Subjective Test Reaffirmed Against Lower Court Departures,
supra note 1; Dix, supra note 2.
16. 287 U.S. 435, 453-59 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring).
17. 356 U.S. 369, 378-85 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
18. See State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375, 382 (Iowa 1974). The Iowa court
accepts the proposition that the real issue in the assertion of entrapment
is whether police conduct was so reprehensible that conviction, as a matter
of public policy, should not be tolerated.
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The majority of the states, however, have adopted the
"subjective theory" of entrapment, originally posited in the
majority opinions of Sorrells9 and Sherman.11 This approach, recently reaffirmed in United States v. Russell,21 has
been accepted in a majority of the states and has been adopted by implication in Wyoming.2" The subjective approach
focuses primarily on the predisposition of the accused to
commit the crime charged or similar crimes, the reprehensible activity of the state generally notwithstanding. 3 The
substantive limitation on police activity is that the state is
precluded from prosecuting crimes that are the result of the
creative activity of the police. This limitation is the ultimate
question involved in a determination of "genesis of intent," 4
which asks where the criminal scheme originated. The courts
have founded the defense upon an implied exception to the
criminal statute. The rationale reasons that considerations
of public policy force the conclusion that the statute was not
meant to apply to an otherwise innocent defendant induced
into committing a criminal act.
The subjective approach to the entrapment defense requires the trial court to consider two issues. Initially, the
accused must show inducement by government officials. It
is generally held that the inducement must be more than mere
solicitation.25 After the showing of inducement the inquiry
shifts to the genesis of intent issue. In this consideration the
court is concerned with whether, given the inducement, the
accused showed any predisposition to commit the offense
charged or similar offenses. Where there has been a sufficient showing of inducement that has not been rebutted by a
19.
20.
21.
22.

Sorrells v. United States, supra note 16.
Sherman v. United States, supra note 17.
411 U.S. 423 (1973).
Higby v. State, 485 P.2d 380, 384 (Wyo. 1971); La Fleur v. State, supra
note 3; Dycus v. State, 529 P.2d 979, 980-81 (Wyo. 1974).
23. This approach actually involves the "genesis of intent" issue predating
Sorrella and Sherman. The issue was whether the accused had formed the
intent before solicitation. See Butts v. United States, 273 F. 35 (8th Cir.
1921); Peterson v. United States, 255 F. 433 (9th Cir. 1919); Yick v.
United States, 240 F. 60 (9th Cir. 1917).
24. Peters v. State, 248 Ark. 134, 450 S.W.2d 276, 278 (1970) ; State v. Harney,
160 Mont. 55, 499 P.2d 802, 805 (1972); Dycus v. State, supra note 22.
25. United States v. Test, 486 F.2d 922, 924 (10th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Jobe, 487 F.2d 268, 270 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 955
(1974); Higby v. State, supra note 22, at 384.
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showing of predisposition, the courts should hold entrapment
as a matter of law. If the inducement has been rebutted by a
showing of predisposition, a jury issue of entrapment is
thereby created.
The courts, at least nominally, have accepted four indications of predisposition: (1) a previous course of similar
criminal activity; (2) a preexisting design to commit the
offense (generally where the accused made the first overt
offer before any solicitation); (3) ready compliance with
undercover solicitation; and (4) a preexisting criminal design where the state, by virtue of undercover investigation,
had reasonable cause to believe that the accused was violating
the law and only afforded an opportunity for commission of
the offense." Factually, however, the courts recognize only
three indications of predisposition. The cases indicating acceptance of ready compliance as a showing of predisposition
usually involve some overt offer by the accused before solicitation has taken place."7 These cases are generally indistinguishable from the cases relying on a demonstrable preexisting criminal design. If inducement has been shown, but not
rebutted by a showing of predisposition, entrapment is held
as a matter of law. If inducement has been rebutted by a
showing of predisposition, a jury issue on entrapment is
created.
Janski
The significant facet of the Janski decision is found in
the Wyoming court's treatment of ready compliance as the
THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE UNDER

26. Janski v. State, supra note 5, at 275, citing Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 886, § 3
(1954).
27. Indicative of the "ready compliance" showing of predisposition is Higby
v. State, supra note 22. Defendant was convicted of unlawful sale of narcotics. The court held that there was no entrapment in the following
situation. Two students were working with local campus police. The students were given money to buy narcotics. They went to a local restaurant
to effect a prearranged meeting with Pryor for the purchase of narcotics.
Pryor was not present. The two agents saw the defendant and asked where
Pryor could be found, explaining that he had agreed to make the sale. Defendant replied that he did not know of Pryor's whereabouts and offered
to get the agents "some stuff." One agent accompanied defendant to his
home and purchased a quantity of hashish. It is vital to note that although
the court spoke of predisposition shown by ready compliance, defendant
made the first overt offer of sale. The issue clearly merges with predisposition shown by preformed criminal design.
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ultimate provable fact in the showing of predisposition."
The court treated ready compliance as sufficient in itself to
establish predisposition and create a jury issue of entrapment. Evidence of Janski's post-solicitation behavior was the
conclusive provable fact in the court's view of the predisposition issue. The focus of the court on post-solicitation behavior
goes to the central issue of the defense, the inquiry into genesis of intent.
Prior to the Janski decision, the Wyoming rule was that
the defense of entrapment was available to the criminally
accused when the criminal scheme had its origin in the mind
of the police and the law enforcement officials actively induced the criminal conduct by implanting the criminal scheme
in the defendant's mind."9 The defense, viewed objectively
or subjectively, looked beyond the acts of the accused in compliance with undercover solicitation in the inquiry into predisposition."0 Generally ready compliance had been received
only as evidence of some ultimate provable fact rebutting
entrapment, the preexisting criminal design, or, less frequently, a pattern of similar criminal activity.2 The showing of
predisposition through a clearly demonstrable preexisting
criminal design or through a pattern of similar criminal activity necessarily involved more than a mere showing of
ready compliance to undercover solicitation.
The proposition that ready compliance is sufficient evidence of predisposition to take the entrapment issue to the
jury severely limits the availability of this defense to a
criminally accused. Accepting ready compliance as sufficient
evidence of predisposition closes the issue. Further inquiry
into the behavior of the accused or the undercover agent becomes, for the most part, immaterial to the issue of entrap28. Although ready compliance is used by the courts as indicative of predisposition, the cases generally involve a demonstrable preexisting criminal
intent on the part of the accused. E.g., Higby v. State, as discussed supra
note 27.
29. Dycus v. State, supra note 22, at 980. This position has also been adopted
in other jurisdictions. Rogers v. State, 277 So.2d 838, 839 (Fla. App. 1973).
30. The creative activity prohibition often precluded prosecutions founded upon
a mere showing of solicitation and ready compliance where the criminal
design was a product of police activities. See La Fleur v. State, supra
note 3, at 314; Rogers v. State, supra note 29, at 839.
31. Janski v. State, supra note 5, at 285-87 (Rose, J., dissenting).
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ment12 The impact of this view of predisposition is that the
traditional genesis of intent issue is largely ignored. A showing of ready compliance can, but does not necessarily, indicate the presence of the preexisting criminal design that is
central to the genesis of intent inquiry. In this context, the
search for predisposition shifts from an investigation into
where the intent originated to an investigation focused only
on the behavior of the accused after solicitation. This inquiry
into the accused's predisposition radically alters a traditional
basis of the entrapment defense, which was the inquiry into
where the criminal intent originated."
With a shift away from an inquiry into genesis of intent
the creative activity doctrine is largely emasculated. The
creative activity doctrine has generally been invoked to prohibit prosecutions where the criminal design originated with
the police and the criminal activity was essentially due to
the creative efforts of the law enforcement officials. 4 Prohibition of "manufactured crimes" is founded on the obvious
policy that justice is not served when law enforcement officials are allowed to, in effect, create crimes for the sole purpose of prosecuting them.3" However, under the Janski ruling
the inquiry is not one into where the criminal design itself
originated, but is only directed at what occurred after the
undercover solicitation. 6 The net effect of the ruling is to
shift the inquiry in the entrapment defense from the question
of where the creative impetus of the activity was lodged to
the question of the defendant's reaction to undercover solicitation.
32.

33.
34.
35.
36.

Inquiry into the coercive activities of the undercover agent would still be
relevant to the issue of ready compliance. The emphasis of this evidence
would be altered-it formerly went to the creative activity prohibitionbut the probative value of the evidence would remain unchanged. Cf. State
v. Bradshaw, 12 N.C. App. 510, 183 S.E.2d 787, 790 (1971).
Exhaustive inquiry into the genesis of intent issue has been the focus of
the entrapment defense since its judicial recognition early in the Twentieth
Century. See Butts v. United States, supra note 23.
Dupuy v. State, 141 So.2d 825, 826 (Fla. App. 1962).
Peters v. Brown, 55 So.2d 334, 336 (Fla. 1951) ; Thomas v. State, 185 So.2d
745, 747 (Fla. App. 1966).
Janski v. State, supra note 5, at 287 (Rose, J., dissenting).
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Janski

The Janski ruling, then, is a potentially radical departure from traditional foundations of the entrapment defense." The inquiry remains as to what evidence is material
to the issue of predisposition under the Janski decision. Certainly evidence as to the defendant's behavior after solicitation is critical to the showing of predisposition through
ready compliance. Although frequently unavailable, evidence of the defendant's resistance to solicitation would serve
to impeach the assertion of ready compliance." Evidence of
coercion by the undercover agent would also rebut the allegation of ready compliance, in effect justifying the defendant's post-solicitation behavior.8
Exemplary of evidence of coercion that might be used to
rebut the allegation of predisposition by ready compliance
is the evidence defendant attempted to present in surrebuttal
in Janski. Had the defendant succeeded in introducing evidence to impeach Laabs' rebuttal testimony as to the type
of weapon carried while on duty, the allegation of ready compliance might have been viewed as coercion when the issue
reached the jury. But the court found no reversible error in
exclusion of this testimony, and decided the issue on procedural technicalities.' 1 Given the narrow limits of the defense
under the Janski holding, however, it would appear that
such evidence is of vital importance to the accused and should
be received almost as a matter of right.4" The policy supporting the introduction of this type of evidence is that the defense of entrapment has been very narrowly defined by the
Wyoming court. Evidence of coercion in response to a show37. Potentially much of the genesis of intent inquiry is left intact under Janski.
The Court does not preclude a showing of predisposition through demonstrable preexisting criminal design or through a showing of similar criminal
activities. Predisposition thus established is the very essence of the traditional approach. However, post-solicitation compliance is usually much
easier for the prosecution to establish. Thus, the potential impact of the
Janski rule is quite significant.
38. Roundtree v. State, 271 So.2d 160, 161-62 (Fla. App. 1972).
39. Bradshaw v. State, supra note 32, at 789. For a discussion of the impact
of coercion evidence in the traditional view of the entrapment defense, see
Annot., 62 A.L.R.3d 110, 145-48 (1975).
40. Janski v. State, supra note 5, at 277-79.
41. Id. at 279.
42. Id. at 292 (Rose, J., dissenting).
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ing of predisposition through ready compliance is critical to
the accused who is attempting to impeach the allegation of
ready compliance.
Essentially, evidence relating to the showing of postsolicitation behavior by the accused is material to the issue
of predisposition under the Janski rule. Evidence relating
to genesis of intent outside the accused's ready compliance
becomes collateral under Janski. The confusion as to the
date of the Laabs-Janski transaction is indicative of the
type of evidence that is traditionally determinative of the
issue of predisposition but that has become collateral under
Janski. Normally evidence of a similar course of criminal
conduct, properly admitted, indicates predisposition." However, such evidence can be highly prejudicial to the defendant. " Attempting to vitiate the prejudicial effects of such
testimony the courts have generally recognized the need to
control carefully the circumstances under which such evidence can be received at trial.4 Under the Janski ruling,
evidence of prior similar criminal conduct, although possibly
admitted under circumstances very adverse to the accused
and highly prejudicial to a traditional showing of predisposition, is collateral to the real issue of the defendant's postsolicitation behavior.
The evidentiary impact of the Janski decision is a result
of the court's willingness to look exclusively at post-solicitation behavior to establish predisposition. Paralleling the shift
of inquiry into predisposition from genesis of intent to postsolicitation behavior, evidence not relating to defendant's
behavior after solicitation is no longer necessary to a showing of predisposition. It is submitted that this forecloses the
possibility of reversible error by admitting potentially pre43. Hansford v. United States, 303 F.2d 219, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
44. Janski v. State, supra note 5, at 288 (Rose, J., dissenting).
45. Courts, recognizing the possibility that the defendant may have no means
of impeaching such evidence, generally carefully control the impact of
such testimony. Hansford v. United States, supra note 43, at 225-26.
46. Janski v. State, supra note 5, at 288 (Rose, J., dissenting).
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judicial evidence unrelated to the necessary showing of predisposition through ready compliance.47
CONCLUSION

The doctrine announced by the Wyoming Supreme Court
in Janski v. State represents a fundamental departure from
the traditional concepts of a sufficient showing of predisposition in the entrapment defense. Although the requirement
that predisposition be shown in terms of where the criminal
design originated has not been completely abandoned in
Janski, the ruling opens a new avenue by which the state can
rebut the defense of entrapment and more easily create a
jury issue of entrapment. Under Janski, ready compliance
is not founded solely in the genesis of intent inquiry, the
hallmark of the defense since its inception. Recognition of a
showing of ready compliance to undercover solicitation as
sufficient to establish predisposition and send the issue of
entrapment to the jury narrowly limits the evidentiary inquiry as to the issue of predisposition. The potential effect
of the Janski doctrine's departure from the genesis of intent
inquiry is to limit radically the viability of the entrapment
defense in Wyoming.
W. MICHAEL KLEPPINGER

47. Id. at 277. The evidence of the date of the sale would generally involve
the genesis of intent issue. Evidence wrongfully admitted and highly prejudicial to a showing of predisposition through prior criminal activity
would traditionally be reversible error. Where, however, the evidence is
wholly unrelated to the issue of predisposition shown through ready compliance, the prejudicial impact of the testimony is circumvented.
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